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SUMMARY 
This study evaluates the court's approach towards the interpretation of administrative justice 
with specific reference to Roman v Williams 1997(2) SACR 754(C). Section 33 of the 
Constitution Act 108 of 1996 guarantees the right to administration justice. The elements of 
this right are lawfulness, reasonableness and procedurally fairness. 
Our courts are bound constitutionally to promote, develop, advance and protect the 
fundamental rights. This study provides the most effective approach towards the 
development of the fundamental right in our democratic society where the Bill of Rights 
binds legislature, executive and judiciary. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The facts in the case of Roman v Williams1 are as follows: the applicant had been placed under 
correctional supervision by the Commissioner of Prisons (respondent) after having served one 
year of a five year sentence. He was summoned to the respondent's office to attend the 
hearing of a complaint received from the correctional officer, who had recorded number of 
breaches of correctional supervisions. The respondent issued a warrant for the arrest and 
detention of the applicant. The applicant applied for a review of the Commissioner's decision 
on the basis that it was unconstitutional and that his arrest and re-imprisonment ought to be 
declared unlawful. The respondent in turn, submitted that his decision was justifiable in 
accordance with the constitutional requirements. 
In this dissertation the constitutional right to administrative justice will be discussed with 
reference to the case law, academic writers and more particularly the decision in Roman v 
Williams. The right to administrative justice is laid down in section 33 of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa Act 108of1996. It reads as follows: 
33 (1) 
(2) 
Everyone bas the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. 
Everyone whose rights have been adversely affected by administrative action has the right to be 
given written reasons. 
(3) National legislation must be enacted to give effect to these rights, and must -
(a) provide for the review of administrative action by a court or, where appropriate, an 
independent and impartial tribunal; 
(b) impose a duty on the state to give effect to the rights in subsection (1) and (2) and 
( c) promote an efficient administration. 
National legislation has been promulgated in the form of the Promotion of Administrative 
Justice Act 3 of 2000. However, this Act has not yet come into operation and the question is 
whether the administrative justice clause of the interim Constitution applies or whether the 
administrative justice clause of the 1996 Constitution2 applies. 
1 1997 (2) SACR 754 (C) 
2 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
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I submit that the 1996 Constitution applies since the legislation has been enacted within the 
stipulated period of three years as required by section 23(2) of Schedule 6 of the 1996 
Constitution. The effect, therefore, is that the administrative justice clause of the interim 
Constitution no longer applies, and that the relevant clause is that contained in section 33 of 
the 1996 Constitution. 
2 THE DEFINITION OF "ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION" 
There is no definition of "administrative action" in either the interim or 1996 Constitutions. In 
a country such as Germany, administrative action is statutorily defined. Section 35 of the 
Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz of 1976 defines administrative action as an order, decision or 
other sovereign measure taken by an authority for the regulation of a particular case in the 
sphere of public law and directed at immediate external legal consequences. In essence, 
administrative action must be directed at a particular consequence, the action must also be 
directed at the general public or be performed in public interest. 
In Goodman v Transnef, the court found that the awarding of a tender by the respondent 
(Transnet) amounted to the management of Transnet's affairs, and that the process by which a 
tender is considered must of necessity be classified as an administrative act. The process, and 
the consideration and award of the tender thus constitutes administrative action. 
Traditionally administrative action has been classified into three categories, namely, legislative, 
judicial and administrative acts. Legislative acts include the power to create, vary or terminate 
rules of general application. Administrative acts involve the implementation of legislation. A 
judicial act relates to the judicial function of administrative tribunals, such as the Film and 
Publications Review Board, created in terms of the Films and Publication Act 65of1996. 
In Bushbuck Ridge Border Committee v Government of Northern Province4 the court 
followed the decision in F edsure Life Assurance v Greater Johannesburg Transitional 
3 1998(4) SA 989 (WLD) at 996 C-F 
4 1999(2) BCLR 193(T) at 199 H 
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Metropolitan Councif, the court held that the promise made to incorporate Bosbokrand into 
Mpumalanga by government officials was not made in terms of any statute, law or regulation. 
The court held that the promise was made by a political party and that a political party does 
not exercise administrative action. 
In President of the RSA v SARFr.I, the Constitutional Court discusses the concept 
"administrative action" in detail. The test for determining whether conduct constitutes 
"administrative action" is not whether the action is performed by a member of the executive 
arm of government. The focus in determining the matter in each case is the function, rather 
that the functionary. The question is whether the task itself is administrative or not. In this 
case the court said that the administration is that part of government which is primarily 
concerned with the implementation of legislation. 
In general the implementation of legislation is an administrative function, while the formulation 
of policy is not. The court conceded that the borderline between the two fields might be 
difficult to determine. What constitutes administrative action should be done on a case-by-
case basis in the light of the provisions of the Constitution and the overall constitutional 
purpose of an efficient, equitable and ethical public administration. 
According to the Constitutional Court the functions of the President and the Premier of a 
Province in assenting to bills and referring bills back to the appropriate bodies, or referring a 
bill to the Constitutional Court to test its constitutionality, do not constitute administrative 
action. Also excluded are: appointments made by the President under the Constitution or other 
legislation, (unless he is acting as head of the national executive); appointing commissions of 
inquiry; calling a national referendum, receiving and recognising foreign diplomatic and 
consular representatives; appointing ambassadors, pardoning offenders and conferring 
honours. 
The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 has included a definition of 
5 1998(12) BCLR 1458 (CC) 
6 1999(10) BCLR 1059 (CC) at 1119 D-E, 1122 B-1 
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administrative action7. In essence the Act follows the findings of the court in President v 
SARFUcase. 
3 THE ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE CLAUSE 
It has already been said that section 33 of the 1996 Constitution is the relevant administrative 
justice clause, which applies to any administrative act. This means that every administrative 
act must be lawful, procedurally fair and reasonable. In Roman v Williams8, the court regarded 
section 33 as the new constitutional test, which must be objectively determined. 
It should be pointed out that the achievement of administrative justice is supported by a 
number of state institutions supporting democracy. These include a Human Rights 
Commission, a Commission on Gender Equality, a Public Protector, the Auditor-General and 
an Electoral Commission. These bodies assist and support the individual in the enjoyment and 
protection of his/her individual rights. The courts are the most important body . controlling · 
administrative action, since they perform a "watchdog function" in protecting~~ndtvHtualrights. 
~..,. ';> 
Section l(a) of the Constitution - the founding provision - states that the Republic of ~(}µth 
Africa is one sovereign democratic state founded on the following values: human 9iFtY, the 
achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms. Section.7(1) and 
(2) provides that the Bill of Rights is the cornerstone of democracy in South Africa - it 
enshrines the rights of all people and affirms these democratic values of human dignity, 
equality and freedom. 
7 In teims of section 1 of the Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000, "administrative action" means any decision or any failure to take a 
decision, by 
a) an organ of state, when 
i) exercising the power in teims of Constitutional or a provincial constitution; or 
ii) exercising a public power or performing a public :function in teims of any legislation; or 
b) a natural or juristic person, other than an organ of state, when exercising a public power or performing a public :function in teims of an 
empowering provision, which adversely affects the rights of any person and which has a direct, external legal effect, but does not include 
i) the executive power or :function of the National Executive 
ii) the executive powers of:functions ofthe Provincial Executive 
iii) the executive powers or :functions of a municipal council 
iv) the legislative :function of Parliament, a provincial legislature or a municipal council 
v) the judicial :functions of a judicial officer of a court and judicial :functions of a traditional leader under customary law or any other 
law 
vi) a decision to institute or continue a prosecution 
vii) a decision relating to any aspect regardingthe appointment of a judicial officer, by the Judicial Service Commission 
viii) any decision taken, or failure to take a decision, in teims of any provision of the Promotion of Access to Information Act of 2000 
ix) any decision taken, or failure to take a decision in teims of section 4(1) of the Act 
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The administrative justice clause, section 195 and the principles of co-operative governance 
laid down in Chapter 3 of the Constitution, provide the framework within which government 
officials and organs of state must perform their administrative functions. Further, section 195 
of the Constitution lays down basic values and principles, which govern the public 
administration. These include a high standard of professional ethics, impartiality, and 
equitability, without bias and accountability. 
It should be pointed out that section 39(1) also promotes administrative justice rights. This 
section provides that in interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum must promote 
the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on humanity, equality and 
freedom. The Bill of Rights recognises the existence of any other fundamental rights or 
freedoms that are conferred by common law, customary law or legislation to the extent that 
they are consistent with the Bill. 
All constitutional provisions referred to above, serve to endorse the commitment to too 
achievement of administrative justice, for it is only in a state where administrative justice 
applies that these democratic values are properly upheld. The attraction of an administrative 
justice clause is that all members of the state (organs of state) are required to comply with its 
principles prior to the making of a decision, thereby setting the parameters within which 
official functions are performed. 
Let us examine the specific subsections of the administrative justice clause, with particular 
emphasis on procedural fairness. 
8 Fn I at 765 
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3. I Lawfulness 
Administrative action must comply with the provisions of the Constitution, particularly, the 
administrative justice clause. It is submitted that South Africa is a state based on law. In the 
apartheid era, Parliament was the supreme legislative authority. Laws were passed that 
excluded judicial scrutiny of the violation of fundamental rights by the government. It is 
submitted that the term "lawfulness" means that the administrative action must comply with 
the Constitution, the Administrative Justice Act, enabling legislation and the common law. 
According to Burns9 "lawfulness" thus becomes an umbrella concept encompassing all the 
requirements for valid administrative action. In order for an administrative act to be lawful, it 
must, therefore, comply with the following. 
(a) The 1996 Constitution 
Administrative action must comply with the provisions of section 33 of the Constitution10. 
The Constitution is the supreme law and all administrative organs and bodies are 
constitutionally bound to comply with the principles of administrative justice, namely, 
lawfulness, procedural fairness and reasonableness. The failure to do so will result in the 
invalidity of the action in question. 
As it has been said, section 33 is the constitutional test. In Roman v Williams11, the court held 
that judicial review no longer has an independent existence apart from the constitutional 
review. The court further held that it needs only concern itself with the constitutional test of 
legality as laid down in section 33. 
(b) The Administrative Justice Act 
The administrative action must also be in compliance with the recently promulgated Promotion 
of Administrative Justice Act, once this Act has come into operation. This Act ensures that 
9 Burns Y: Administrative Law under the 1996 Constitution (1998) at 138 
10 See Introduction 
11 Fn 1at764 
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administrative action is valid by setting out the grounds for a valid administrative act (section 
6). In essence, this Act includes all the common law requirements for valid administrative act 
by setting the standards and parameters within which the state administration must perform its 
duties. 
( c) Enabling legislation 
Enabling legislation defines the nature, content and powers of administrative action. It defines 
the parameters within which a specific administrative organ must function. It also stipulates 
procedures to be followed any specific qualifications necessary to perform any administrative 
action. Any statute passed regulating administrative action must comply with the 
Administrative Justice Act when it comes into operation. 
In Roman v Williams, section 84B of the Correctional Services Act 8 of 1959 for example 
defines the functions and powers of administrative organ. Section 84B (I) reads: If the commissioner 
is satisfied that a probationer has failed to comply with any condition to whicli he is subject in relation to correctional supervision either by 
agreement or as may be daerrnined by the court of the Commissioner, he may issue a warrant for the. arrest of sucli a probationer, whicli may be 
executed by any peace officer as defmed in section 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, and whicli shall serve as authorisation for the 
daention of sucli a probationer in a prison until he~ 
is lawfully discliarged or released therefrom; 
is placed under correctional supervision by the Commissioner in his discrdion. 
( d) Common law 
The Constitution does not deny the existence of any other rights or freedoms that are 
recognised or conferred by common law, customary law or legislation to the extent that they 
are consistent with the Bill. 
When determining whether administrative justice has been complied with the courts will also 
examine the common law. The common law therefore gives meaning to the content of the 
term "administrative justice". 
Common law requirements include the requirement relating to the author of the act. The form 
of administrative action, the purpose of the administrative action and the requirement relating 
8 
to bona fides. Most of these requirements are stipulated in the enabling statutes. The statute 
often sets out the powers and function, the limitations, as well as requirements relating to the 
specific qualifications of the author of the administrative action. 
In Roman v Williams, the court held that common law review grounds are inapplicable to the 
case as it needs to concern itself with constitutional test of legality. Van Deventer J, said that 
the constitutional test overrides the common law review grounds12. It is therefore, submitted 
that common law review grounds are subsumed under the Constitution. Common law derives 
its enforcement from the Constitution. In other words, common law is subject to the control of 
the Constitution. 
The approach in Roman v Williams is in accordance with the decision in Pharmaceutical 
Manufactures of SA: In re: Ex parte Application of RSA 13• In this case the Constitutional 
Court found that common and constitutional law grounds of review are not two separate 
systems of law. There is only one law shaped by the Constitution and all law including 
common law is subject to constitutional control. 
3 .2 Procedural fairness 
In Ramburan v Minister of Housing (House of Delegates/4, the applicant was not.afforded an 
opportunity to defend himself before the administrative decision was taken. The court found 
that the denial of a fair procedure is a fatal irregularity, which invalidates the administrative 
action. 
There are different school of thought concerning the content of the constitutional right to 
procedural fairness. Bums, submits that this constitutional right is strictly speaking confined 
to procedure rather than substantive fairness. Substantive fairness is included in the form of 
the justifiability and reasonableness of the administrative action 15 . 
12 Ibid at 264B 
13 2000(3) BCLR 24l(CC) at 260 F-G 
14 1995(1) SA353 (WLD) at 364 
15 Fn9at167 
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In Administrator, Transvaal v Traub16, Corbet CJ following Ridge v Baldwin(1964) AC 40 
said that the duty to act fairly is simply another, and preferable way of saying that the decision-
maker must observe the principle of natural justice. The court in Maharaj v Chairman, Liquor 
Board17, held that procedurally fair administrative action is more than just the application of 
the audi alteram partem and nemo iudex in sua causa rules. It involves the principles and 
procedures which are right, and which must be fair in the particular circumstances. 
It is submitted therefore that procedural fairness should be given an extensive meaning to 
include substantive procedure. In Roman v Williams, the court held that the role of the court 
in judicial review is no longer limited to the way in which administrative decision is reached. It 
extends to the substance and merits of the decision18. Principles which are right, just and fair 
are based on the substance of the administrative action. Aronson and Franklin19 state that in 
England "fairness" is increasingly being used in a substantive sense as a description of the 
abuse of discretion. They also submit that procedural fairness may serve other purposes as 
well as opening the process of government broadening public participation in decision-making 
to the extent that the disclosure of material and giving of reasons is required. 
The Constitutional Court in President of RSA v SARFU20, held that the requirement of 
procedural fairness is not necessarily relevant to every exercise or public power. The court 
further held that there is no authority for the proposition that whenever prejudice may be 
anticipated, a functionary exercising public power must give a hearing to the person likely to 
be affected by the decision. 
Procedural fairness depends on the circumstances of each case21 . In Dladla v Administrator, 
16 1989 (4) SA 731(A)at758 G 
17 1997(1) SA 273 (NPD) at 277 
18 Fn 1 at 767H 
19 Review of Administrative Action (1997) at 108 
20 Fn 6 at 1149 F-G 
21 In the English case:, Doody v Secretary of State for Home Department (1993) All ER 92 (HL) at 106 d-h 
Lord Mustill stated the following, "What does fairness require in the present day? My lord I think it is llllllecessary to refer by name or to 
quote from any of the often-cited authorities in whidi the court has explained what is essentially intuitive judgement. They are far too 
well known. From them I derive the following: 
(1) Where an Act of Parliament confers an administrative power there is a presumption that it will be exercised in a manner whidi is 
fair in all the cir<;umstances. 
(2) The standards of fairness are not immutable. They may diange with the passage of time both in general and in application to 
decisions of a particular type. 
(3) The principles of fairness are not to be applied identically in every situation. What fairness demands is dependent on the context 
of the decision and this is to be taken into account in all aspects 
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Natat22 applicants were denied legal representation at disciplinary inquiries held as a result of 
their participation in a stay-away. The court held that the disadvantage from which they 
suffered on that score was aggravated by differences of race, culture, language and 
background that distanced them from officials, impairing the prospects of shared insights and 
mutual understanding. Further, the refusal to allow them legal representation was vitiated by 
the failure of those responsible for the decision to exercise proper discretion in reaching it. 
Their need for legal representation to defend them was strong in all circumstances. 
Since the content of procedural fairness is determined in accordance with but not limited to the 
principles of common law. We should examine the common law principles of natural justice. 
(i) Audi alteram partem rule 
This rule connotes the opportunity to be heard and that the affected party must be informed of 
considerations which have been made against him. In Administrator, Transvaal v 
Theletsane23, Henochsberg J held, What the audi rule calls for is a fair hearing. Fairness is 
often an elusive concept; to determine its existence within a given set of circumstances is not 
always an easy task. No specific encompassing test can be laid down for determining whether a 
hearing is fair, everything will depend upon the circumstance of the particular case. There are 
at least two fundamental requirements that need to be satisfied before a hearing can be said to 
be fair, there must be notice of the contemplated action and proper opportunity to be heard. 
( 4) An essential feature of the context is the statute which creates the system within the decision taken. 
(5) Fairness will very often require that a person who may adversely be affected by the decision will have an opportunity to make 
representations on his own behalf either before the decision will have an opportunity to make favourable results or after it is 
taken, with view to procuring its modification or both. 
( 6) Since the person affected usually cannot make worthwhile representations without knowing what factors may weiglit against his 
interests fairness will very often require that he is informed of the gift of the case which he has to answer. 
22 (1995) 16ILJ1418 (H), 1423 F 
23 1991 (2) SA 192(A) at 206 C 
11 
(ii) Opportunity to be heard 
Opportunity to be heard means that affected person must be given an opportunity to present 
his case. In R v University of Cambridge24 Lord Fortescue said that, the laws of God and 
man both give the party the opportunity to make his defence, ifhe has any. He held that even 
God himself did not pass sentence upon Adam and Eve before they were called upon to make 
their defence. It is therefore submitted that the person affected must be consulted and be 
heard. 
In Arepee Industries v Commissioner for Inland Revenue25 , Galgut J held, that according to 
the audi alteram partem rule, a party to an administrative proceeding which may lead to 
action, or decision affecting his rights, is entitled to present his case. He held that it provides 
that before such a interference the official or body concerned must, as the Latin words 
indicate, hear his side of the matter. The court held that the reason for such an entitlement is 
that without being informed, a person will not know what it is that might be held against him. 
In Director Mineral Development, Gauteng Region v Save the Vaal Environment26 the court 
examined the provision that required the director to enquire into the nature of the terrain 
which would be violated by relevant mining operations. The court found that the effect of 
such violation and the law in which the terrain could and should be rehabilitated, would have 
to take into account the likelihood of damage. This creates legitimate concerns, and the 
director would therefore have to give the affected person an opportunity to be heard at that 
stage, unless there are provisions which require them to defer raising the environmental 
concern to a later stage. 
Opportunity to be heard also requires that an affected person be given adequate notice of 
impending administrative action. In Cekeshe v Premier, Eastern Cape21, the court held that 
generally the principle of natural justice requires that persons likely to be affected by 
administrative decisions, acts, proceedings be given adequate notice of what is proposed so 
24 1 Str 557, 93 Eng. Rep. 689 (KB) 1723 
25 1993 (2) SA216 (NDP) at220 F-1 
26 1999 (8) BCLR 845 (SCA) at 851 J-852 A-B 
27 1998(4)SA935(Tk)at962B 
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that they may be in a position to make representations on their behalf should they so wish. 
The court in Ansell v Welll8 held that each party must be told the substance of anything 
adverse to him and that the case being advanced by the other party. In Nisec v Western Cape 
Provincial Tender Board29, the court held that a right to a hearing includes the provision of 
such information that which would render the hearing meaningful. In other words, the 
aggrieved party must be given an opportunity to know all the ramifications of the case against 
him and be provided with the opportunity to meet such a case. 
Fair notice is an important part of procedural fairness. Jones de Villars30 states that it is 
inipossible to give a fair hearing to a person who has no notice whatever of the action which a 
statutory delegate proposes to take. It is therefore submitted that the reason behind the notice 
is that a person cannot properly prepare his case without knowing what to expect. 
An aggrieved party must also be informed of his right to legal representation when there are 
difficult legal issues. In Pete v Greyhound Racing Association31, Lord Denning said that it is 
not every man who has the ability to defend himself on his own, he cannot bring the points in 
his own favour or the weakness in the other side. He may be tongue-tied or nervous, confused 
or wanting in intelligence. The court held that if justice is to be done, he ought to have help of 
a counsel or solicitor. 
(iii) Nemo iudex in sua causa 
In terms of this rule an administrative organ must be free from bias and prejudice. This stems 
out of the maxim justice must not only be done, it must also be seen to be done. In 
Liebenberg v Brakpan Liquor Licensing Boanf'2 the mayor of the town involved himself by 
being present when an applications for liquor licence was heard. His brother was one of the 
applicants and his application was approved. The court found that the mayor's relationship 
28 (1982) 43 AL.R 41 at 62 
29 1997 (3) BCLR 367 (C), at 371 H 
30 Principles of Administrative Law (1994) at 247 
31 (1969) 1Q.B.125 at 132 
32 1944 WLD 52 
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had lead to bias and the decision was set aside. 
The accusation of bias must be substantiated. In Roman v Williams, the court held that the 
applicant's counsel considered that there were no factual grounds on which the accusation of 
bias could be justified33. 
3. 3 Justifiability/reasonableness 
In terms of section 33 of the 1996 Constitution all administrative action must be reasonable. 
However, no reference is made to the requirement of justifiability. It is submitted that 
justifiability still plays a part in determining whether an administrative action is valid or not. 
Cachalia et af4 state that administrative justifiability reqmres a decision to be rational, 
coherent and capable of being reasonably sustained having due regard to the reasons for the 
administrative decision. Davis et af 5 concurred. They state that justifiable administrative 
action entails rationality between the decision itself and the reasons given. 
De Ville36 says that the word 'justifiable" is open ended and the recognition of the right to a 
justifiable action suggests an intention to create and entrench a new requirement of legality. 
He submits that only administrative action that is suitable and necessary to achieve the 
statutory purpose and the proportional harm to an individual can be said to be justifiable. 
Burns37, summarises justifiable administrative action as requiring that a decision be rational, 
and based on logic and sound reason. The reasons advanced for the action must show that the 
action is adequately just or right, it must comply with the limitation clause of the constitution, 
and lastly that the principle of proportionality, in the sense of reasonable, fair and good 
administrative behaviour be applied. 
Our courts have played an important role in the interpretation of the term 'justifiability''. In 
33 Fn 1at770 
34 Fundamental Rights in the New Constitution (1994) at 74 
35 Fundamental Rights in the Constitution: Commentary and Cases, (1997) at 161 
36 "Proportionality as a Requirement of Legality in Administrative law in tenns of the New Constitution" (1994) 9 SAPRIL, at 365. 
37 Fn 8at195 
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Carephone v Marcus'8, the court referred to the New Shorter Oxford Dictionary, holding that 
according to the dictionary meaning, ')ustifiable" means "able to be legally or morally defined, 
able to be shown to be just, reasonable'. The court thu~ held that section 24( d) of the Interim 
Constitution 200 of 1993 introduced a requirement of rationality in the outcome of the 
administrative decision. 
In Kotze v Minister of Health39, the court also made reference to the Shorter Oxford English 
Dictionary. It held that 'justifiable" means capable of being justified or shown to be just, and 
that which can be defended. The court held that section 24( d) requires that the reasons 
advanced must show that the action is adequately just or right based on the accurate 
application of the law and findings. 
It is submitted that administrative justifiability should be objectively determined. The court 
must assess the surrounding facts and circumstances and consider the relevant facts. In Roman 
v Williams, the court held that in order to prove justifiability an administrative action must be 
objectively tested against the requirements of suitability, necessity, and proportionality. They 
involve the test of reasonableness. The court further held that the constitutional test embodies 
the requirement of proportionality between the means and end40. 
In Mbelu v MEC for Health and Welfare, Eastern Cape41 , nurses were dismissed for engaging 
in industrial action strike. They were prohibited to strike in terms of section 19 of the Public 
Service Labour Relation Act 105of1994, despite the constitutional right to strike. The court 
found that the prohibition on striking, (in terms of section 19) was a reasonable and justifiable 
limitation. The Court held that the nursing profession constitutes an essential service. It is a 
vulnerable profession and the withholding of service could endanger lives. 
The same principles were applied in Dabe/stein v Hilderbrandf2. In this case the court had to 
determine the justifiability of the Anton Piller order. Farlam J held that the power to grant 
38 1998 (10) BCLR 1326 (LAC), at 1336 F 
39 1996(3) BCLR 497 (T), 425 
40 Fn 1, at 767 G-H 
41 1997 (2) SA 823 (Tk), 835 E-H 
42 1996(3) SA 42 (CPD) 65E, 166 C-D 
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such an order in appropriate cases is necessary m our society, provided orders granted 
pursuant to such power contain adequate safeguards. He further held that the requirement of 
proportionality must also be satisfied, even if the interests to be balanced by the court in 
applying the requirement of proportionality include those of dignity, property and so on. 
It is submitted that justifiable administrative action refers to good, proper and suitable 
administrative action. There must be a reasonable explanation between the means and ends of 
the administrative action. This means that there must be a reasonable connection between the 
administrative action and the reasons given for such an action. 
Some writers equate justifiability and reasonableness. According to Basson43 the right to 
administrative action which is 'justifiable" in relation to the reasons given and the right to 
"reasonable" administrative action should be given the same meaning. Basson's submis~on is 
confirmed by the decision of the court: In the dictionary meaning referred to in Carephone 
case, 'justifiable" means "able to be shown to be reasonable". 
The court in Afrisum Mpumalanga v Kunene44 also held per Southwood J, that section 33 of 
the Constitution clearly envisages rational decision making by administrative bodies and 
tribunal. Held further that reasonableness and justifiability must be given the same meaning as 
appears from the provision of section 23(2)(b) of schedule 6 of the Constitution. 
It is interesting to note that recently promulgated Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 
2000 does not make specific provisions for justifiability. The Act does however, make 
provision for a rational decision (section 6(1)(f) (ii). The Act also provides that decisions 
which are so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have so exercised that function, are 
invalid. 
3.3.1 Rationality 
Rationality means that administrative action must be based on reasons or made according to 
43 South Africa's Interim Constitution: Text and Notes (1994) 35-36 
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reasons. In Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for Civil Service45 , Lord Diplock held 
that an irrational decision is a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or logic 
or accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question 
to be decided could have arrived at it. 
Jowell and Lester 46 commented on Lord Dip lock's decision. They say that Lord Dip lock has 
shown that even though a decision may be legal in that it falls within the legislative powers, it 
may also be substantively lawful. 
3.3.2 Reasonableness 
Our courts traditionally adopted a narrow approach to the question of unreasonableness. 
According to this approach, the courts will intervene where the administrative action is so 
gross that something else can be inferred from it such as ma/a fides, ulterior motive, the failure 
to apply one's mind to the matter. The courts were generally reluctant to substitute their 
opinion for that of the official, who was assumed to have the necessary expertise to exercise 
the power. 
In Shidiack v Union Governmenf 7 , Innes ACJ said, " Now it is settled law that where a matter is left to 
the discretion or the determination of a public officer, and where his discretion has been bona fide exercised or his 
judgement bona fide expressed, the court will not interfere with the result. Not being a judicial functionary no 
appeal or review in the ordinary sense would lie; and if he has duly and honestly applied himself to the question 
which has been left to his discretion, it is impossible for a court of law either to make him change his mind or to 
substitute its conclusion for his own." 
In Union Government v Union Steel Corp48, the court found that there is no authority known 
of and none has been cited for the proposition that a court of law will interfere with the 
exercise of a discretion on the mere ground of its unreasonableness. The court further states 
that unreasonableness must be so gross that something else can be inferred from it, such as 
44 1999(5) BCLR 549 (T), 574 
45 1985 AC 374 
46 "Beyond Wednesbury: substantive principles of administrative law" 1987 Public Law 368, at 369. 
47 1912 AD 642 
48 1928 AD 220. Wiedters, Administrative Law (1985) at 241 commented about the decision of the court. He says that the emphasis falls not 
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ma/a .fides, ulterior motive or failure to apply one's mind. The decision is based on the 
subjective state of mind of the administrator49. 
In Theron v Ring van Wellington NG Sendingkerk in Suid-Afrika 50, Jansen JA went beyond 
this traditional/narrow approach when he adopted an extended formal yardstick. According to 
this yardstick, unreasonable administrative action constitutes an independent ground for 
judicial review. This was unfortunately not a majority's view and the decision was related to 
judicial administrative acts only, having the position of purely administrative acts unresolved. 
Gross unreasonableness is no longer a requirement for the review of administrative action. 
The court in Standard Bank of Bophuthatswana v Reynol<f 1 held that the test of "gross 
unreasonableness" (in view of the testing rights given to the court in the interim Constitution), 
does not accord with the modern approach of judicial review particularly when applied to a 
constitution such as the South African one, which contains a Bill of Rights. The court adopted 
the less stringent test of reasonableness. 
In Roman v Williams, Van Deventer J said that justifiable administrative action must be 
objectively tested against the three requirements of suitability, necessity and proportionality 
which requirements involve a test ofreasonableness52. 
It is interesting to note that the Constitution simply refers to reasonable administrative action 
without any indication as to whether it will be "gross" unreasonableness or not. The 
Administrative Justice Act does, however, refer to unreasonableness in section 6. It refers to 
an action which is so unreasonable that no reasonable person would have so exercised the 
power. How will the courts interpret this provision? It appears to be a reference to the older, 
narrow approach to reasonableness and the question is whether this provision is constitutional 
or not. 
on the unreasonable effect and consequwces on the act as sudt, but on the unreasonable state of mind of the administrative organ. 
49 Judicial intervention was permitted only where the administrative decision was so gross that something else can be inferred from it, sudt as 
mala fides, ulterior motive or when administrative organ has failed to apply his mind to the matter. Unreasonableness was equated to mala 
fides, ulterior motive and other ground of invalidity. Unreasonableness, alone was not ground of invalidity. 
50 1976 (2) SA l(A) 
51 1995 (3) SA 74 (B) at 94 
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3 .3 .3 Proportionality 
The principles of proportionality guide the process by which administrative decisions are 
reached. It requires a rational link between an administrative action, its objective and the 
merits of the matter. The words such as "unduly burdensome, excessive, disproportionate" 
reflect the essence of the principle of proportionality. 
Joseph states the following: "The principle of proportionality holds simply that excessive means should not 
be employed to achieve given ends. If attaining a legitimate legislative goal requires circumscribing freedoms, then 
the limitation must not be wider than is necessary. The principle also logically imports the need for a 'rational 
connection' between the limitation and desired legislative policy (the limitation must secure the object sought)"53 . 
We may examine comparative law to see how proportionality is approached in countries such 
as Australian, English, German, Canadian and South African law. 
(i) Australian law 
The principle of proportionality is determined by "unreasonableness" and lack of evidence. 
Douglas and Jones54 say, "The evidence test requires no more than that there should be some evidence to 
justify the decision - a requirement that is also what one would expect of most administrative decisions". In the 
case of unreasonableness they say that a test is formulated in a manner which at least on its 
face, decision-maker may not make decisions which are so unreasonable that no reasonable 
decision-maker acting according to law could have made. 
The court in Minister of Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs v Pashmfoosh55 , 
held that federal legislation emphasises the need for reasoned decision making and the decision 
may be set aside on the basis of insufficiently supported reasons. It could be arbitrary because 
of no evidence or other material. 
52 Fn 1 at 767 G 
53 Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (1993) at 714 
54 Administrative law: Commentary and Materials (second edition) (1996) at 442 
5 5 Federal Court 28/06/89, wrreported, at 11 
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(ii) English law 
Jowell and Lester56 say that proportionality is applied as a principle that requires a reasonable 
relation between a decision, its objective and the circumstances or a given matter. They say 
that it requires the pursuit oflegitimate ends by means which are not oppressively excessive. 
According to Jowell57 proportionality originated in German administrative law. It provides 
that when a broad discretionary power has been conferred upon a decision-maker, the means 
used to achieve the legitimate aims of that power must be appropriate and necessary and not 
excessive. He also states that proportionality requires a balance between the relative merits of 
the different interests. The decision-maker must not place disproportionate emphasis on some 
interests. The least harmful means must be adopted in balancing the interests. 
Proportionality is connected to the substance of administrative action rather than the manner in 
which it has been reached. It also requires the adoption of alternatives suitable for the 
administrative decisions. 
In R v Goldstein58 Lord Diplock says that in plain English "proportionality" means "You must 
not use a steam hammer to crack a nut, if a nutcracker would do". The reviewing court 
determines the relationship between the objective of the administrative action and the means to 
achieve it59. 
(iii) German law 
In Germany, the Bundesverfassungsgericht declares the principle of proportionality as being 
central and of general importance. The advantages and disadvantages of administrative action 
are compared and determined as suitable or proper. Administrative action is exercised in terms 
of the principle of Verhiiltnismiissigkeit. This requires the compliance with the principle of 
56 Proportionality "neither novel nor dangerous" in New Directions in Judicial Review, Jowell and Oliver eds (1988) 51 at 67 
57 Administrative Justice in Southern Africa (1997) at 180-181 introduced and edited by Corder and Maluwa. 
58 1983 (1) WLR 151at155 
59 H alsbury 's Law of England Vol. 14 fourth edition (re-issue) 1989, at 144 states, ''the court will quash the exercise of discrdionary 
power in whidJ. there is no reasonable relationship bdween the objective whidJ. is sought to be adJ.ieved and the means used to that 
end, where punishments imposed by administrative bodies or inferior courts, are wholly out of proportion to the relevant misconduct". 
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suitability, necessity and proportionality. 
Singh 60 says that proportionality limits administrative organs from exercising their discretions 
as they wish. Administrative organs have to balance the community and individual interest. 
They must also abstain from taking action that causes heavy burdens on the existence of an 
individual. 
(iv) Canadian law 
The court in R v Oakes61 held that the principle of proportionality requires that administrative 
action must be reasonable and demonstrably justified. The court also held that proportionality 
requires the reasonableness means to achieve the object of administrative action. The means 
(administrative decision) must be carefully made to attain the object of administrative action. 
They must not be arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational consideration. In short, the court 
further held that the measures (administrative action) must be rationally connected to the 
administrative objectives. The administrative action must impair as little as possible the right 
or freedom in question. The effects of administrative measure must also be proportionate. 
(v) South African law 
Proportionality is included in the limitation clause of the Constitution. Section 36(1) of the 
Constitution reads thus: The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general 
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including -
(a) the nature of the right; 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
( c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
( d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
( e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
60 German administrative law: in common law perspective (1995) at 91 
61 (1986) 26DLR(41H)200(SCC)at277 
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The court in Roman v Williams held that there must be proportionality between the means and 
end, this means that there must be a link between the administrative means and the end62 . This 
approach is line with that approach adopted in countries such as, Germany, Canada, Australia, 
and United Kingdom. 
In Moletsane v Premier of the Free State63 , the applicant was suspended for alleged 
misconduct. The court held that proportionality clauses indicate the correlation between the 
action taken and reasons furnished. The court also held that the more drastic the 
administrative action taken, the more detailed the reasons which are advanced should be. The 
degree of seriousness of the administrative action should determine the peculiarity of the 
reasons furnished. The court further held that notice of suspension unequivocally states that 
the suspension is "pending a departmental investigation into alleged misconduct", 
administrative action was justifiable in relation to the reasons advanced, having due regard to 
the applicant's rights affected. 
Necessity and suitability are elements of proportionality. Necessity is the last administrative 
measure after all other administrative measures or actions are proved insufficient to the 
circumstances of the matter. De Ville64 says that necessity must be determined once various 
suitable means to achieve ends have been determined. The administrative organ must choose 
means which cause least harm and if there is only one suitable measure it will be regarded as 
necessary. 
The court in S v Makwanyane65 held that the limitation of Constitutional rights for a purpose 
that is reasonable and necessary involves the weighing up of competing values and ultimately 
an assessment based on proportionality. The court also held that the balancing process must 
be made considering the provision of the limitation clause. 
In United Democratic Front (Western Cape Region) v Van der Westhuizen66 , the 
62 Fn 1at767 
63 1996 (2) SA 95 (0) at 98 G-H, 99 C 
64 Fn 36 at 366 
65 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) at 708 
66 1987 (4) SA926 (C) at 930-931 
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commissioner of police prohibited the holding of a meeting. The applicant, opposing the 
decision, argued that the commissioner failed to consider alternatives to the prohibition. The 
court held that it was unreasonable to prohibit outright the holding of a meeting, when the 
objectives which the commissioner had in mind and provision made by law could have been 
achieved by imposing the condition to protect and establish the objectives. 
Suitability should also be established from the empowenng legislation. The court must 
establish the purpose of the exercise of power and it must also be legally authorised. 
From this brief discussion, it is apparent that the concepts of ')ustifiability", "proportionality", 
and "reasonableness" play an important role in determining administrative justice. Justifiability 
and reasonableness have acquired a similar juridical meanings and content. 
4. THE DECISION IN ROMAN v WILLIAMS 
In this case, as it has been said, the respondent terminated the applicant's correctional 
supervision and reinstated imprisonment, it was contended on the one hand that the decision in 
issue be set aside on one or more of the common law gr~:mnds of review. On the other hand, it 
was contended that the decision was unjustifiable in relation to the reasons given for it, as laid 
down in section 33 of the 1996 Constitution67. 
It has already been said that the court did not find the common law review grounds relevant. 
Van Deventer J said that they were inapplicable and the court need only concern itself with the 
constitutional test of legality. Van Deventer J also said that like the test of reasonableness, the 
constitutional test must be objective. Further, in order to qualify as justifiable in relation to the 
reasons given for it, three requirements must be met, namely, suitability, necessity and 
proportionality68. 
With regard to reasonableness or justifiability, the court thus accepted that the decision of the 
respondent was rationally connected to the reasons given for it. The court objectively tested 
67 Fn 1 at 763 D-E 
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the respondent's decision. It considered the main objects of correctional superv1s1on, the 
substance and the merit of the case. The court held that the success of any probationary 
programme aimed at rehabilitation depends on the strict adherence to supervisional conditions. 
Correctional supervision should be strictly administered and constantly monitored. 
The court found that the applicant refused to pay maintenance as ordered by the divorce court, 
and he interfered with his ex-wife's right of custody by taking their minor son without her 
permission. He did not submit to discipline. His correctional supervisor complained about his 
hostile attitude and the applicant was given warnings. The court, thus considered the 
respondent's decision based on character assessment, impressions and personal experience. 
The respondent complied with the requirements of procedural fairness. The applicant was 
given an opportunity to be heard. In other words, the requirements of audi alteram partem 
rule were complied with. The respondent said, "I gave him a hearing in front of Mrs Lodewyk. I looked at 
his status report. I saw for example that in annexure 'CER8' my predecessor, Mrs. Truter, had given him final 
warning on the 10th September 1996 regarding his attitude in respect of payment of maintenance. I also annex 
hereto marked 'B' a written warning issued on the 23rd August 1996 given to the applicant for breaching his 
di . f .. ,,69 con tions o superv1s10n. 
The court accepted the respondent's version, holding that the applicant was fully apprised of 
the contraventions complained of and the respondent's reasons. The applicant was also given 
an adequate notice as warnings were issued to him. The second leg of the rules of natural 
justice, namely, nemo iudex in sua causa, was also adhered to. The applicant's counsel 
conceded that there was no factual grounds on which the accusation of bias could be justified. 
In essence all the requirements for a fair procedure were, therefore, complied with. 
The court held that the respondent has shown good and sufficient grounds for his decision in 
that the applicant was an unsuitable probationer for the discipline and objectives of 
correctional supervision70. The decision of the respondent was justifiable in relation to reasons 
given for it. Held further that the applicant displayed a lack of appreciation and co-operation. 
68 Ibid at 764-765 
69 Ibid at 762G-H 
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He was convicted of attempted rape of a woman in an awful manner. He was given the chance 
of serving four-fifths of his sentence outside prison walls. 
5. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, one can say that the case of Roman v Williams illustrates the court's approach 
in testing the requirement of just administrative action. The respondent acted lawfully, 
reasonably and procedurally fair. He complied with the requirements laid down in section 3 3 
of the Constitution. 
In Roman v Williams Van Deventer J found that the applicant had acted improperly, 
unlawfully and in conflict with the conditions of his correctional supervision. He further said 
that the applicant had not submitted to discipline and that he had abused the opportunity to 
serve his sentence outside the prison walls. The court found that the decision of the 
respondent in terms of section 84B(I) of the Correctional Service Act to re-imprison the 
applicant was justifiable in relation to the reasons given for it 71 . 
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